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Abstract
Fairness is becoming an increasingly important concern when
designing markets, allocation procedures, and computer sys-
tems. I survey some recent developments in the field of multi-
agent fair allocation.
1 Introduction
Many important decisions in our lives are increasingly be-
ing made by computers. These decisions include whether
we get a certain job or loan. It becomes imperative then
that computer systems provide guarantees that the deci-
sion has been made transparently and fairly. For many
settings such as two-sided matching, fairness considera-
tions based on justified envy or diversity guarantees are en-
shrined in the letter of the law. Even for smaller day to
day decisions, the appetite for fairness guarantees is natu-
rally present among people.1 At a bigger scale, the Inter-
net leads to peer to peer interactions where fairness comes
up as an important concern (see, e.g. Moulin (2019) and
Kleinberg, Rabani, and Tardos (2001)).
The issue of what is fair and how to achieve fair-
ness has been studied in several disciplines including
economics (Moulin 2003; Thomson 2011), political sci-
ence (Brams 2008; Balinski and Young 1982) and philoso-
phy (Rescher 2002; Rawls 1971).2
I mention some recent developments in fair allocation in
multi-agent systems. In particular, I discuss allocation of
indivisible items (Section 2), allocation of divisible items
(Section 3), two-sided matching (Section 4), and fairness in
other social choice settings (Section 5). Finally, I wrap up
the discussion in Section 6.
1See, for example, the interest in fair allocation portal
www.spliddit.org/).
2Despite the richness of fairness concepts and principles in
these literatures, I will only focus on a handful of fairness con-
cepts in this paper. Other fairness ideas include indices to measure
inequality (see, e.g. Atkinson (1970)) or market-based approaches
in which agents have equal budgets (see, e.g. Varian (1974)).
2 Allocation of Indivisible Items
When indivisible items are allocated among agents, guar-
anteeing the existence of fair allocations is impossible for
many desirable notions of fairness. For example, if there are
two agents and one indivisible valued good, allocating the
good to either of the two agents will make the other agent en-
vious. In other words, an envy-free allocation may not exist.
Another challenge is computational. Suppose agents have
positive additive utilities over the items. Then the problem
of checking whether there exists an envy-free allocation is
NP-complete even for 1-0 utilities (Aziz et al. 2015). Simi-
larly the problems of computing allocations that maximize
the egalitarian welfare (utility of the worst off agent) or Nash
welfare (geometric mean of the utilities of agents) is NP-
hard (see, e.g. Nguyen et al. (2014)).
Given these challenges, a couple of influential fairness
concepts were proposed by Budish (2011). The first one
is called maxmin share (MMS) fairness. The maxmin fair
share of an agent is the best she can guarantee for herself
if she is allowed to partition the items into bundles for
the agents but then receives her least preferred bundle.
An allocation satisfies MMS fairness if each agent’s
allocation is at least as preferred to her as her maxmin
fair share. Although an MMS fair allocation is not guar-
anteed to exist even for additive utilities, the concept
gives rise to approximation versions in which each agent
aspires to get a certain percentage of her maxmin fair
share (Procaccia and Wang 2014). This has led to several
results including new algorithms that are faster, simpler, or
provide better approximation guarantees, or work for more
general families of utilities (see e.g. Ghodsi et al. (2018),
Aziz et al. (2017b), Amanatidis et al. (2015),
Barman and Krishnamurthy (2017) and
Huang and Lu (2019)).
The second solution concept that has been proposed is
a relaxation of envy-freeness called envy-free up to one
item (EF1). An allocation satisfies EF1 if it is envy-free
or any agent’s envy for another agent can be removed if
some item is ignored. Under additive utilities, EF1 can be
achieved by a simple algorithm called the round-robin se-
quential allocation algorithm. Agents take turn in a round-
robin manner and pick their most preferred unallocated
item. The interest in EF1 was especially piqued when
Caragiannis et al. (2016) proved that for positive additive
utilities, a rule based on maximizing Nash social welfare
finds an allocation that is both EF1 and Pareto optimal. The
result has led to very interesting followup work. For exam-
ple, Barman, Krishnamurthy, and Vaish (2018) presented a
pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for the same setting to
compute an Pareto optimal and EF1 allocation. The returned
allocation also provides a 1.45 approximation of the maxi-
mum Nash welfare.3
A majority of the results on indivisible items assume
that the items are goods yielding positive utilities (see e.g.
Bouveret, Chevaleyre, and Maudet; Lang and Rothe (2016;
2016)). In recent years, there has been a push to ob-
tain similar existence and algorithmic results for
negative utilities (see e.g. Aziz (2016)) or more gen-
eral utility functions (Plaut and Roughgarden 2018;
Oh, Procaccia, and Suksompong 2019). For example,
Aziz et al. (2019a) designed an algorithm that returns in
polynomial time an EF1 allocation for doubly monotonic
separable preferences.
There are ongoing efforts to develop models and al-
gorithms that take into account real-life features includ-
ing distributional constraints, dynamic and online settings,
distributed settings, and asymmetric agents. An interest-
ing new setting that has been considered is one in which
the agents are partitioned into groups and the items are
allocated to groups (Segal-Halevi and Suksompong 2019).
Researchers have also been exploring stronger or alterna-
tive fairness and efficiency concepts. For example, there is
a renewed focus on concepts that concern envy between
groups of agents (Aziz and Rey 2019; Conitzer et al. 2019;
Benabbou et al. 2019). Another direction concerns scenar-
ios where items are viewed as nodes of a graph and only
those allocations are considered in which each agent gets a
connected coalition (Bouveret et al. 2017).
3 Allocation of Divisible Items
When divisible items are allocated among agents, it is eas-
ier to guarantee the existence of fair allocations. It can also
be relatively easier to compute a fair allocation. Again, con-
sider the example of two agents and one item. If the item is
divisible, we can simply allocate half of the item to each
agent, guaranteeing many reasonable fairness criteria in-
cluding envy-freeness.
In contrast to the case of indivisible items, an envy-free
and Pareto optimal allocation always exists for the case of
divisible items. For positive additive utilities, such an allo-
cation can be computed by maximizing Nash social welfare
in polynomial time. When the utilities are additive but neg-
ative, there are still important gaps in our understanding of
the computational complexity of envy-free and Pareto opti-
mal allocations (see e.g. Bogomolnaia et al. (2017)).
3There is a stream of papers primarily focussed on approxi-
mating Nash welfare. For example, Cole and Gkatzelis (2015) pre-
sented a polynomial-time 2.889-approximation algorithm for max-
imum Nash welfare.
For divisible items, one important class of utility func-
tions is called Leontief preferences in which each agent
requires fixed proportions of the items (such as 1 CPU
and 5 GB RAM to perform one task). Ghodsi et al. (2011)
proposed a solution for the problem of allocating as
much of each item as possible while equalizing the
agents’ use of the fraction of their own dominant (bot-
tleneck) resource. The method satisfies envy-freeness,
proportionality, Pareto optimality, and strategyproofness.
These solutions have been extended in important ways
such as dealing with indivisibilities and dynamic set-
tings (Parkes, Procaccia, and Shah 2013).
Another model of divisible items is called cake-
cutting (Robertson and Webb 1998; Procaccia 2016;
Procaccia 2013). A cake is a unit interval representing a
heterogeneous item. An agent may have different utilities
for different subintervals, even if they are of equal size.
The challenge is to compute fair allocations using queried
information from agents. Cake-cutting has a very long
history dating back to the inception of the mathematical
theory of fair division. Two of the most well-studied
concepts are envy-freeness and proportionality (each agent
gets at least 1/n of her value of the whole cake). While
there are well-known and simple algorithms to compute
a proportional allocation, finding envy-free allocations
is more challenging. In the last few years, new algo-
rithms have been proposed that compute an envy-free
allocation in a number of queries that is bounded in
the number of agents. The algorithms work for either
positive utilities (Aziz and Mackenzie 2016) or negative
utilities (Dehghani et al. 2018). There is no known bounded
algorithm for the case of mixed utilities. It has also been
noted by the authors that if the requirement to allocate the
whole cake is relaxed, then there are simpler and faster
algorithms to compute an allocation that is both envy-free
and proportional. In recent years, several new variants
of the cake-cutting problems have been studied (see, e.g
Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann (2015)).
Recently, researchers have approached problems
where indivisible items are allocated among agents,
but a minimal number of items are shared or treated
as divisible to guarantee existence of fair alloca-
tions (Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi 2019). The approach
can be viewed as a natural extension of the Adjusted Winner
rule (see e.g. Brams and Togman (1996)) that finds an
envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation among two agents
in which only at most one item is shared.
Money can also be viewed as a divisible item that
can be moved around to achieve fairness. A well-studied
discrete allocation problem with money is the fair room-rent
division problem (see e.g. Alkan, Demange, and Gale;
Abdulkadirog˘lu, So¨nmez, and U¨nver; Gal et al. (1991;
2004; 2017)).
4 Two-Sided Matching
In two sided matching markets (see e.g. Manlove (2013)),
the goal is to match entities from two different sets. A typical
example of the problem is one where students/doctors are
matched to school/hospitals. Students have preferences over
schools. Schools have priorities over students. An outcome
in these settings is a matching of students to schools.
In two-sided matching, an important criterion of desirable
outcomes is a fairness property that requires that no student
should want to replace another student in a hospital when the
hospital has a higher priority for the former student over the
latter student. The concept is also based on the idea of envy.
The only difference is that an agent can only envy another
agent if the former has higher priority.
The property of fairness along with that of non-
wastefulness (no student prefers to take some empty
slot in a school) are the central properties that un-
derpin much of the work on two-sided matching. For
many general two-sided matching markets, the two prop-
erties can be simultaneously satisfied by an allocation
returned by the well-known Deferred Acceptance algo-
rithm (Roth 2008) or its generalizations. For several im-
portant settings such as the allocation of school seats to
students (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003), one version of
the algorithm additionally satisfies strategyproofness.
An important research agenda extends this kind of re-
sult to other two-sided matching problems with distribu-
tional constraints. These constraints included upper quo-
tas on regions of hospitals (see e.g. Kamada and Kojima;
Biro et al.; Goto et al. (2015; 2010; 2016)) as well as target
lower quotas for diverse representation (Aziz et al. 2019b;
Ehlers et al. 2014; Kurata et al. 2015). These new settings
give rise to fundamental questions of tradeoffs between
merit, diversity, and segregation.Yet another direction is tak-
ing a time-sharing approach to two-sided matching (see e.g.
Aziz and Klaus; Kesten and Unver (2019; 2015)).
5 Fairness in other Social Choice Settings
We have mostly focussed on allocations problems where
agents get ownerships of their allocation. We can also con-
sider allocation of public goods such as the funding of public
projects. Public goods can be selected via voting on the dif-
ferent options. In classical voting settings in which a single
alternative is to be selected, it is very difficult to guarantee
reasonable representation of sizable minorities. Consider the
case where 51% of the agents most prefer alternative a and
49% of the agents prefer alternative b. Then alternative a
that is supported by a majority is selected even though the
remaining agents may find it unpalatable.
There are other voting settings where fairness con-
cerns become more meaningful. One such setting is a
simple extension of single-winner voting to selecting
multiple winners (see e.g. Aziz et al.; Faliszewski et al.;
Aziz (2017a; 2017; 2019b)). Another setting is proba-
bilistic voting or portioning in which each alternative is
given a certain probability weight or a fraction of a bud-
get (see e.g. Airiau et al.; Aziz, Bogomolnaia, and Moulin;
Aziz; Brandt (2019; 2019; 2019a; 2017)). In both set-
tings, meaningful fairness axioms have been proposed and
algorithms have been designed to satisfy the axioms. A
general principle while formalizing the axioms is that of
proportional representation: if a large enough group co-
hesively prefers some outcome(s), then that group should
get suitable representation (see e.g. Aziz and Lee (2019)).
Recently, fairness concerns are also being examined in
participatory budgeting problems in which projects have
costs and there is a constraint on the maximum bud-
get that can be used (Fain, Goel, and Munagala 2016;
Aziz, Lee, and Talmon 2018; Fluschnik et al. 2017).
Another collective decision-making setting where fair-
ness becomes more meaningful is the case where there are
several issues with each issue having its own candidates
outcomes (Conitzer, Freeman, and Shah 2017). Agents have
preferences over outcomes over each of the issues. The set-
ting is more general than allocation of indivisible items in
following way. Each issue corresponds to the decision of al-
location of a particular item. The possible outcomes of an
issue correspond to giving the item to one of the agents. It
turns out that a solution based on maximizing Nash social
welfare satisfies both Pareto optimality and a natural relax-
ation of proportionality.
6 Discussion
I discussed some settings where fairness plays an important
role. Fairness concerns can come up in many other multi-
agent settings as well such as auctions and coalition for-
mation. Much of the work in multi-agent fair allocation is
centered around formal axioms to capture fairness.4 It will
be interesting to use data-centric approaches to understand
how humans conceptualize fairness or decide on tradeoffs
between societal outcomes.
Another area of computer science where fairness is
taking center stage is machine learning. Machine learn-
ing algorithms learn from data to make actionable sug-
gestions such as giving a loan. Whether these algorithm
are biased is a prominent concern for society (see, e.g.
Kleinberg et al. (2018)). A natural approach to incorporate
fairness in these algorithms follows the Aristotelian “equal
treatment of equals” principle. It is an interesting challenge
to explore ways in which ideas from multi-agent fair alloca-
tion can contribute to fairness in machine learning. In gen-
eral, the interplay of fairness with other desirable aspects
such as accountability, transparency, and trust is broad re-
search question (see, e.g. Shin and Park (2019)).
As computers start to make important decisions in our
lives, it is timely to revisit the lessons learnt. New computer
applications will give rise to novel and challenging problems
so it is critical to continue updating our toolkit of axioms
andmethods for designing and enabling fair multi-agent sys-
tems.
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